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  History and Constitutional Interpretation: 
Some Lessons from the Vice Presidency 
Joel K. Goldstein* 
In recent times, the principal demarcation in academic 
discussions of constitutional theory and judicial decision-
making separates originalists and living constitutionalists.1  
Both categories include a variety of approaches, but in 
essence originalists believe that a constitutional text 
means forever what it meant when it became part of the 
Constitution, whereas living constitutionalists believe that 
constitutional meaning is not fixed but evolves in response 
to societal changes.2  Living constitutionalists draw 
inspiration from Chief Justice John Marshall’s immortal 
words from McCulloch v. Maryland that the Constitution is 
“intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, 
 
      * Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I 
am grateful to Mark Killenbeck and to the members of the Hartman Hotz Lecture 
Committee for the invitation to deliver the lecture in Mr. Hotz’s memory on April 14, 
2016.  The list of prior Hotz lecturers itself made this invitation a real privilege, but 
my appreciation increased on December 2, 2015, when I had lunch with my friend, 
David V. Capes, a 1971 graduate of University of Arkansas School of Law and a 
co-founder of the St. Louis law firm of Capes Sokol.  When conversation turned to 
people who had influenced us in our legal careers, David replied that while in law 
school he had worked for a brilliant lawyer in Fayetteville who had pressed him to 
dig deeper into subjects and to master the context of the legal problem as well as 
the specific subject at hand.  He credited this lawyer with having helped shape the 
practices he adopted during his career.  “His name was Hartman Hotz and there’s 
a lecture at the law school named for him,” David said.  His testimonial enhanced 
for me what was already a cherished honor and my experience at the law school 
and interaction with members of the faculty and students made it a truly 
memorable occasion for me.  Roy E. Brownell, II provided insightful comments 
which drew on his deep knowledge of the history of the vice presidency which 
helped me improve this article.  Jordan Buchheit provided valuable research 
assistance and Stephanie Haley provided helpful administrative assistance. 
1.  Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 
241 (2009) (describing “the primary divide in American constitutional theory” as 
between originalists and nonoriginalists).  
2.   See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Do We Have a Living Constitution? 59 DRAKE 
L. REV. 973, 975 (2011). 
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to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”3  For 
originalists, the Constitution’s original meaning prevails over 
constitutional interpretations based on other methodologies.4  
Living constitutionalists tend to be more pluralistic in the type of 
arguments they endorse.5 
 This categorization, like many shorthands, obscures as 
well as illuminates.  In part, the dichotomy implies that those in 
the first group always follow originalism and that those in the 
second group never do.  In fact, originalists often adopt,6 
sometimes candidly, sometimes not,7 other modes of 
constitutional argument.  Similarly, non-originalists almost 
invariably accord originalism some place in their 
methodologies.8  Virtually everyone agrees that originalism in 
some sense is relevant to constitutional interpretation.9  To 
paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, we are all originalists, we are all 
nonoriginalists,10 although perhaps not to the same extent.  (Or, 
as Groucho Marx more cynically put it, “These are my 
principles.  If you don’t like them I have others.”)11 
Moreover, the divide between originalism and living 
constitutionalism implies that originalists view constitutional 
interpretation as a historical exercise whereas living 
 
3.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819). 
4.  Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 242-43. 
5.  See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Calling Them As He Sees Them: The 
Disappearance of Originalism in Justice Thomas’s Opinions On Race, 74 MARY. L. 
REV. 79, 81 (2014) (comparing Justice Thomas as a professed originalist with 
constitutional pluralists). 
6.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1754 (2015) [hereinafter 
Fallon, History in Constitutional Adjudication] (“[F]ew originalists are exclusive 
originalists.”). 
7.  See, e.g., Goldstein, Calling Them as He Sees Them, supra note 5, at 80 
(pointing out that Justice Thomas uses various nonoriginalist arguments in race 
cases, not originalism). 
8.  See, e.g., Fallon, History in Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 6, at 
1754 (“[N]early all of those who characterize themselves as nonoriginalists readily 
acknowledge the importance to constitutional adjudication of evidence bearing on 
the original meaning of constitutional language.”). 
9.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for 
the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 165 (“It is hard to quarrel with 
the proposition that the views of the Framers are relevant to constitutional 
interpretation.”). 
10.  NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF PRESIDENT 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1801 AND 1805 5 (2001). 
11.  Julius Henry “Groucho” Marx Quote (Feb. 7, 1983), in THE YALE BOOK OF 
QUOTATIONS 498 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006). 
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constitutionalists subordinate the past while drawing principally 
from the present to look towards the future.  Some even 
characterize originalism as the exclusive historical 
approach.12 
It is not.  Originalism represents only one, or actually 
only several,13 types of historical arguments used to 
interpret the Constitution or to explain constitutional 
conclusions.  Yet there are many other ways that history is 
used to illuminate constitutional meaning.  In fact, history 
pervades constitutional interpretation.14  Virtually every 
form of constitutional argument draws from the past, and 
accordingly living constitutionalists, like originalists, lean 
heavily on history in interpreting the Constitution.15  
History and constitutional interpretation go together. 
Contrary to common portrayal, the real dichotomy in 
constitutional interpretation is not between those who use 
or ignore history.  It is rather between those who purport to 
focus on certain discrete historical moments when 
interpreting the constitution, namely when a particular 
constitutional text was written or ratified, and those who 
see the relevant constitutional history as a continuing 
process which stretches well past the moment of textual 
creation towards the present.  David Strauss has helpfully 
delineated these competing approaches as the command 
and common law approaches.16  Whereas the command 
 
12.  See, e.g., Scott Douglas Gerber, Clarence Thomas’ Views to Loom 
Larger at Supreme Court Following Scalia’s Death, THE PLAIN DEALER (Mar. 6, 
2016, 6:16 AM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2016/03/clarence_thomas_views _ 
sure_to.html#incart_river_index [https://perma.cc/Y39A-C9NT] (calling Thomas the 
Court’s “only remaining proponent of the historical approach to interpreting the 
Constitution . . .”); cf. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13 
(1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION] (conflating 
historical and originalist arguments); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: 
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE] (“Historical argument is argument that marshals the intent of the draftsmen 
of the Constitution and the people who adopted the Constitution.”). 
13.  Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.  329, 332-36 
(2013) (describing various originalist approaches); Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 
243-62 (describing varieties of originalist approaches of recent decades). 
14.  Fallon, History in Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 6, at 1753 
(“Appeals to history, and to the authority of decisions made in the past, occur 
nearly ubiquitously in constitutional law.”). 
15.  Id. at 1755. 
16.  DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 36-37 (2010). 
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theory sees law as an order from an authorized boss or 
sovereign, the common law approach sees law as 
developing over time, as “the evolutionary product of many 
people, in many generations.”17  The dichotomy Strauss 
identifies does not turn entirely on whether law occurs at a 
discrete, identifiable time or emerges through an 
evolutionary process but that distinction is part of, or 
perhaps a consequence of, the difference.18  Adherents of 
the command model look at the time when a text becomes 
law to find constitutional meaning whereas the common 
law approach uses history panoramically and admits the 
possibility that today’s interpretation may subsequently 
yield to new conclusions based on history that has not yet 
happened.19  Although sometimes a constitutional text 
remains continually linked to its original meaning, more 
often constitutional argument relies on dynamic, not 
originalist, historical arguments to allow the Constitution, in 
Chief Justice Marshall’s words, “to endure for ages to 
come.”20 
This article discusses the use of history in 
constitutional interpretation by focusing on the 
Constitution’s provisions relating to the vice presidency.  If 
that approach seems somewhat idiosyncratic, it is only 
because it is.  It is also opportunistic since it allows me to 
write about the subject I know best, one I have been 
studying for more than forty years. 
Yet using the vice presidency as a case study of 
historical approaches to constitutional interpretation also 
has some more general validity.  Most discussions of 
constitutional theory focus on the justiciable clauses of the 
Constitution, the texts and resulting doctrines that engage 
the Supreme Court in high profile cases.  Professor 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., has recently written a 
comprehensive and characteristically illuminating account 
of the roles of history in constitutional adjudication21 and, 
as is usually the case after Professor Fallon addresses 
 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. at 37. 
19.  Id. at 10, 36-38. 
20.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819). 
21.   Fallon, History in Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 6. 
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even such a large subject, his discussion is so 
comprehensive and thoughtful that little remains for others 
to say about the various ways courts use history in 
constitutional cases. 
Yet much recent scholarship has recognized that 
significant constitutional interpretation occurs outside of 
the courts in the regular operation of political institutions.22  
Even courts, dating at least to McCulloch have recognized 
that the judiciary does not possess a monopoly over 
constitutional interpretation.23  Although sometimes courts 
claim they are the ultimate constitutional interpreters,24 in 
other contexts they acknowledge the superior claims of 
another branch.25  Scholars have explored the use of 
history in judicial decisions.  Perhaps it is time to look 
elsewhere.  As the great philosopher Yogi Berra once said 
about a St. Louis restaurant, “Nobody goes there 
anymore.  It’s too crowded.”26  The study of constitutional 
interpretation and practice outside the courts receives less 
traffic but offers insights into those activities.  There is 
often reward in wandering off the beaten trail. 
The recent shift in emphasis of originalism from 
original intent to original meaning also invites attention to 
nonjusticiable parts of the Constitution.27  Whereas 
original intent was offered in the late twentieth century as 
a strategy to promote judicial restraint and accordingly 
 
22.  See, e.g., HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS 
INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION (2015) (discussing frequency and importance of 
presidential interpretations of the Constitution); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE 
FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY (2013) (also 
discussing presidential interpretations of the Constitution).  See also Richard 
Albert, How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written Constitutions 38 
DUBLIN U. L.J. 387 (2015) (discussing role of constitutional norms and conventions 
in producing informal constitutional change in United States and Canada).  
23.  See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 401-02 (recognizing the role of past 
practice of political branches in shaping constitutional meaning); Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (recognizing political question doctrine under which some 
constitutional questions are left to political branches). 
24.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
25.  See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993) 
(concluding the Constitution empowers the Senate to decide what “try” means in 
Impeachment Trial Clause of Constitution). 
26.  YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 16 (1998). 
27.  Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Change, Originalism, and the Vice 
Presidency, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 369, 382 (2013) [hereinafter Goldstein, 
Constitutional Change]. 
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leave more decisions to elected officials,28 originalists 
have now subordinated that goal.29  Instead, they advance 
original meaning as the preferred methodology on the 
grounds that it reflects the true constitutional meaning.30  
Yet if original public meaning is the route to constitutional 
interpretation, then it is such not only for provisions judges 
construe but also for those that receive legislative or 
executive, not judicial, interpretations.31  If originalism no 
longer finds its primary justification in restraining judges, 
there is no reason to test it simply in judicial settings. 
Of course, the belief that the nonjusticiable portions of 
the Constitution present fertile areas of study does not 
necessarily lead to those parts relating to the vice 
presidency.  Yet these vice-presidential provisions present 
some advantages in exploring historical approaches to 
discerning constitutional meaning.  Several such 
constitutional provisions exist and history has shaped their 
meanings at different times and in different ways. 
Moreover, the vice presidency has recently 
undergone a remarkable, and very positive, 
transformation.  The trials and tribulations of the office 
through most of American history are legendary.32  It is no 
longer the office the framers created and its recent 
development is the major recent success story of 
American governmental institutions.33  What has made the 
vice presidency successful is that it has evolved in 
response to practice, consequential considerations, and 
structure—three  types of historical constitutional 
argument which are featured in McCulloch v. Maryland—
 
28.  Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a 
Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464-65 (1986); see also Thomas B. 
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714 (2011); Keith E. 
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 601-02 (2004). 
29.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1185, 1189 (noting that new originalism has dropped the emphasis on judicial 
restraint with new focus on correct interpretation). 
30.  Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 378-80. 
31.  Id. at 382. 
32.  JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY: THE PATH TO 
SIGNIFICANCE, MONDALE TO BIDEN 1 (2016) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE 
HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY]. 
33.  Id. at 4-5, 301-03. 
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and away from the framers’ original design in every 
respect.34 
It is no coincidence that I have mentioned McCulloch 
several times.  Few cases teach so much about 
constitutional interpretation as does McCulloch and few, if 
any, have taught so much about McCulloch as The 
University of Arkansas Law School’s distinguished 
scholar, Mark R. Killenbeck, in his wonderful book35 and 
other writings36 on that canonical case.  As Professor 
Killenbeck wrote, “The consensus is that the principles for 
which M’Culloch stands lie at the heart of the American 
constitutional order, that this is one case that no one 
interested in the Constitution or the history of this nation 
can afford to ignore.”37  McCulloch, as Professor 
Killenbeck points out, is not simply about the nature of the 
Constitution and methods of constitutional interpretation.  
Yet those subjects are among the areas of constitutional 
law on which McCulloch sheds light and are the topic of 
this discussion. 
I.  SOME TYPES OF HISTORICAL ARGUMENT 
Scholars have identified various forms of argument, 
justification, and considerations conventionally used in 
constitutional interpretation.  For instance, Charles A. 
Miller identified constitutional text, doctrine, precedent, 
social evidence, and history in his 1969 study of the 
Supreme Court’s use of history.38  He subdivided history in 
various ways including original intent—or understanding—
and ongoing history.39  Philip Bobbitt later identified six 
modalities of constitutional argument—historical 
 
34.   Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 401-10. 
35.  MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND: SECURING A NATION 
(2006). 
36.  See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck, It’s More Than a Constitution, 49 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 749, 752 (2005). 
37.  KILLENBECK, supra note 35, at 7. 
38.  CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 14-
20 (1969). 
39.  Id. at 20-28.  For instance, Miller distinguished between history internal to 
a case, i.e., its factual background, and that which is external to the case which 
included history internal to the law, such as precedents and legal history, and 
history external to the law such as general history.  Id. at 20-26. 
654 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69:647 
(originalist), textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and 
prudential.40  In 1987, Richard A. Fallon, Jr. focused on 
five conventional types of constitutional argument.41  More 
recently, Professor Fallon has pointed out the ubiquity of 
historical argument in constitutional adjudication and has 
identified at least sixteen different types of historical 
argument that appear in constitutional decisions.42 
Although originalism comes in various forms,43 all 
involve historical inquiry.  With respect to the original 
Constitution, original intent or intent of the framers looked 
to evidence of the subjective intent of the men who wrote 
the Constitution in Philadelphia or, in some cases, ratified 
it in their various colonies.44  A similar inquiry was made 
regarding the intent of those who drafted or ratified various 
amendments.  As critics pointed out problems with 
interpreting the Constitution to coincide with original 
intent,45 some migrated to original understanding which 
associated constitutional meaning with the subjective 
understandings of how particular constitutional language 
would operate at the time it was added.46  More recently 
most originalists emphasize the original public meaning of 
constitutional language as dispositive although many 
concede that it is often indeterminate and must give way 
to constitutional construction, whereas others rely on a 
hypothetical reasonable person to produce meaning.47  
Notwithstanding these different species of originalism, 
 
40.  BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 12, at 12-13; 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 12, at 7, 93-98. 
41.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV.  1189, 1189-90 (1987) [hereinafter 
Fallon, Theory of Constitutional Interpretation].  
42.  Fallon, History in Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 6, at 1759-96 
(identifying twelve types of historical arguments or sixteen including different types 
of originalism).  See also Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of 
History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 660 (2013) (identifying eleven types of 
historically based constitutional arguments). 
43.  See, e.g., Fallon, History in Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 6, at 
1762-72. 
44.  See, e.g., Colby, supra note 28, at 720; Colby & Smith, supra note 1, 
247-50.  
45.  See Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 248-49. 
46.  Id. at 250-52. 
47.  Id. at 254-55. 
2016] CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 655 
they all look for historical evidence at or about the time a 
constitutional text was written or ratified. 
But the various forms of originalism do not 
monopolize historical interpretation.  On the contrary, 
virtually every mode of constitutional argument involves 
history in one way or another.  Take textual argument.  
Textual interpretation requires some premise regarding 
the time frame when its meaning will be set.48  
Disagreements over the meaning of terms like 
“commerce,” “executive power,” and “cruel and unusual” 
stem in part from differences regarding whether the 
meaning of those words was fixed at ratification or is 
capable of change.  Notwithstanding these and other 
differences, there are areas of agreement.  The 
Constitution prohibits someone who is not a “natural born 
Citizen” from serving as President.49  Although all do not 
agree on whether to anchor that phrase to its eighteenth-
century meaning, all interpret the term as imposing a 
geographic or perhaps a parental criteria; no one has 
seriously argued that a Caesarean delivery would 
preclude a newborn from serving as President.50 
Precedent or doctrinal argument is inherently 
historical in several ways. To begin with, one relying on 
judicial precedent must look backwards to find the 
decisions to apply.  Yet application is not automatic, 
especially where constitutional interpretation is involved.  
Sometimes the Court rejects a prior decision in order to 
apply a different rule based on experience.  As Justice 
Louis D. Brandeis pointed out in a classic dissent, “The 
Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of 
better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and 
error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate 
also in the judicial function.”51  Courts consider the impact 
of subsequent developments on precedent before 
 
48.  Cf. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 12, at 26, 36 
(arguing that textual approach relies on contemporary meaning of constitutional 
language); Fallon, Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 41, at 1197-
1198, 1252. 
49.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
50.  Fallon, History in Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 6, at 1760-61. 
51.  Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405, 407-08 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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deciding to follow it.  Have later changes in law or fact 
strengthened or weakened the rationale for applying the 
precedent?52  Has the precedent proved workable in its 
past applications?53  Is the received rule a historical 
outlier, lacking in prior support or subsequent 
application?54 
Three other types of historical constitutional 
arguments—ongoing practice, consequential or pragmatic 
argument, and structural argument—apply to the history of 
the vice presidency.  These types of arguments invite 
attention here because they were prominent in McCulloch 
v. Maryland, the classic case which is the subject of 
Professor Killenbeck’s book, and they impact nonjudicial 
behavior. 
Ongoing practice presents an important way that the 
behavior over time of nonjudicial governmental institutions 
shapes constitutional meaning especially regarding 
separation of powers.55  Writing in The Federalist Papers, 
James Madison recognized that constitutional language 
required liquidation through practice to determine 
meaning.  “All new laws, though penned with the greatest 
technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature 
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and 
equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and 
ascertained by a series of particular discussions and 
adjudications,” he wrote.56 
Whereas precedent or judicial doctrine looks to past 
judicial behavior as a source of constitutional meaning, 
ongoing practice finds constitutional meaning established 
or influenced by the actions of nonjudicial governmental 
 
52.  Burnet, 285 U.S. at 412 (“[C]onditions may have changed . . . Moreover, 
the judgment of the Court in the earlier decision may have been influenced by 
prevailing views as to economic or social policy which have since been 
abandoned.”); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 855, 857-60 (1992) (identifying subsequent changes in fact or law as 
factors that might undermine a precedent). 
53.  See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543, 
545, 546 (1985) (rejecting existing constitutional rule as unworkable).  
54.  See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116, 117 (1941) 
(rejecting prior rule as based on novel principle which had not been followed). 
55.  Fallon, History in Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 6, at 1777. 
56.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
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actors, such as executive officials and congressmen.57  
Thus, in McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall 
considered the past behavior of the executive branch and 
Congress in concluding that Congress had power to 
create a Bank of the United States.58  He observed that “a 
doubtful question . . . in the decision of which . . . the 
respective powers of those who are equally the 
representatives of the people, are to be adjusted . . . ought 
to receive a considerable impression from [government] 
practice.”59  More than a century later, Justice Felix 
Frankfurter wrote that “a systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress 
and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents 
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution . . . may 
be treated as a gloss on ‘executive [p]ower’ . . .” that 
Article II vested in the President.60  Practice is often 
viewed as a relevant factor even when it began or 
occurred long after the founding period.61  Not all past 
nonjudicial activity counts as precedential, Michael 
Gerhardt has pointed out, but that which is discoverable 
and is acted upon sufficiently frequently may have such 
significance.62 
Consequential or prudential arguments respond to 
circumstances and rest on the premise that wherever 
possible the Constitution should be interpreted in a 
manner likely to lead to good, rather than bad, results.63  
Such arguments appear frequently in Court cases 
including, and inspired by, McCulloch64 where Chief 
 
57.  JOHN B. ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13-15 (4th ed. 2012). 
58.  17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819). 
59.  Id. 
60.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
61.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (“[T]his Court 
has treated practice as an important interpretive factor even when . . . that practice 
began after the founding era.”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 
(1981) (relying on long practice of Congressional acquiescence as basis for finding 
of presidential authority to suspend judicial claims). 
62.  MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 112-13 (2008). 
63.  ATTANASIO & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 57, at 19. 
64.  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408 (arguing that Constitution should be construed 
to allow beneficial execution of governmental powers); id. at 415 (“It must have 
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Justice Marshall advanced the basic premise that 
wherever possible the Constitution should be interpreted 
in a way that promised success rather than failure.65  Chief 
Justice Marshall argued in McCulloch that “general 
reasoning” rejects the idea that the Constitution should be 
interpreted in a way that would imperil its basic 
purposes.66  Consequential argument relies on historical 
data to form conclusions about the likely impacts of 
competing interpretations. 
Finally, structural arguments discern general 
constitutional principles from the architecture and themes 
of the Constitution.  Whereas textual arguments base 
constitutional conclusions on specific clauses speaking 
directly to a problem, structural arguments find principles 
in the larger design of the Constitution to influence 
construction.67  Thus, in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall 
used structural reasoning to reach his two central 
conclusions:  that Congress had power to create the Bank 
of the United States and that Maryland lacked power to tax 
such a federal instrumentality.68  Structural reasoning may 
seem originalist because it relies on a wide-angle view of 
the text to find themes or patterns in its construction.69  
Yet as the study of the presidency and vice presidency 
illustrate, structural argument is also inherently historical 
because the Constitution’s formal provisions regarding 
these institutions have changed throughout American 
history.  Accordingly, structural reasoning in these areas 
requires some understanding of how ideas implicit in 
constitutional amendments shape constitutional themes 
more generally through the interaction of constitutional 
language created at different times by different 
generations based on different experiences. 
 
been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, so far as human 
prudence could insure, their beneficial execution.”). 
65.  Id. at 408. 
66.  See id. at 408-11. 
67.  CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-8 (1969). 
68.  Id. at 14-15. 
69.  ATTANASIO & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 57, at 18. 
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II.  THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION AND THE VICE 
PRESIDENCY 
The White House vice presidency that exists today 
bears no resemblance to the office the founders created.  
The Constitution initially made provision for the selection 
of the Vice President70 and gave that officer a regular 
duty, to preside over the Senate,71 and a conditional duty, 
to serve as a presidential successor.72  With respect to 
each of these provisions, those regarding the selection, 
the ongoing duty and contingent role, the Constitution’s 
apparent original intent or meaning was jettisoned, quickly 
in two cases and over time in the third, and replaced by 
arrangements that developed through ongoing practice 
and in response to prudential considerations.  In each 
instance, one form of historical argument yielded to others, 
in each case, practice informed by prudential judgments 
prevailed over the original approach, and in each case, 
constitutional norms shifted in response to 
experimentation and prudential judgments. 
A. The Presidential Election Clause 
The framers probably created the vice presidency to 
help solve the vexing question of how to elect a 
President.73  The Constitution initially gave electors two 
votes for President but provided that one vote had to be 
cast for someone not from the elector’s state, a measure 
designed to combat the parochialism the framers thought 
 
70.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (providing that Vice President was runner up 
in presidential balloting).  
71.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The Vice President of the United States 
shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally 
divided.”). 
72.  U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President 
from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and 
Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the 
Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or 
Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then 
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be 
removed, or a President shall be elected.”). 
73.  GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 12; 
Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 505, 512-13 (1995) [hereinafter Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice 
Presidency]. 
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would otherwise preclude the choice of a national 
President after George Washington served.74  They 
apparently created the vice presidency to encourage 
electors to make serious use of both votes.75  The 
evidence of original intent is scant, as it often is,76 and the 
incomplete nature of the records makes the challenging 
task of fathoming the intent of a collective body even more 
elusive.77  Still, at the Constitutional Convention, delegate 
Hugh Williamson explained that a Vice President “was not 
wanted” but that the office was “introduced only for the 
sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to 
be chosen at the same time.”78  The vice presidency and 
the Electoral College apparently entered the Convention at 
the same time and the only discussion of the second office 
in The Federalist Papers comes at the end of No. 6879 
describing the Electoral College.80  These parallel tracks 
are not coincidental but tend to confirm the relationship of 
the two institutions.  In Federalist 68 Alexander Hamilton 
effusively praised the Electoral College arrangement, 
saying that it was, if “not perfect, it is at least excellent.”81  
Actually, it was not.82 
The framers apparently intended and expected the 
electors to exercise discretion,83 to act independently,84 
 
74.  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 167 (2005) 
[hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION]; TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF 
THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1787-1804 23 (1994). 
75.  AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 74, at 167-68; Richard 
Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 817-18 (2005). 
76.  EDWIN M. YODER, THE HISTORICAL PRESENT: USES AND ABUSES OF THE 
PAST 76, 79 (1997) (stating that “original constitutional materials” including those 
regarding the 1787 Philadelphia, and state ratifying, conventions “range from 
fragmentary to nonexistent.”). 
77.  See id. at 79-80. 
78.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 537 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966). 
79.  GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 12, 
318. 
80.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 56, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton). 
81.  Id. at 412. 
82.  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 391 (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION] (calling it “a calamity waiting to happen . . .”). 
83.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 56, at 412 (“It was equally desirable 
that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the 
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and to cast two presidential votes.85  In fact, those original 
intents and expectations were soon frustrated as parties 
formed and presented tickets.  Although formally electors 
still cast two votes for President, it was understood that 
one candidate was intended for the presidency, the other 
for the second office.86  The system survived the election 
of 1796 when competing presidential candidates John 
Adams and Thomas Jefferson wound up in the presidency 
and vice presidency respectively although Adams had run 
with Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina and Jefferson 
with Aaron Burr.87  In a sense, the Adams-Jefferson 
election was how the system was supposed to function, 
with the two top men elected, though without the 
intervention of political parties which introduced a 
complication. 
But in 1800, Jefferson and his ticket partner, Burr 
tied.88  Although each had seventy-three electoral votes, 
Jefferson’s were for President whereas Burr’s were de 
facto for Vice President.89  It took the House of 
Representatives thirty-six ballots before enough 
 
qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to 
deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements 
which were proper to govern their choice.  A small number of persons, selected by 
their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the 
information and discernment requisite to so complicated investigations.”); JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 531 (1987). 
84.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 56, at 412 (“And as the electors, 
chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are 
chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats 
and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they 
were all to be convened at one time, in one place.”); STORY, supra note 83, at 531, 
532. 
85.  GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 12.  
86.  See, e.g., RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 510 (2004) (referring to 
“vague understanding” among Federalists that Adams was presidential and 
Thomas Pinckney vice-presidential candidate); KURODA, supra note 74, at 57 
(describing election of 1792 as election for vice presidency); id. at 108 (noting that 
politicians and journalists differentiated between presidential and vice-presidential 
candidates). 
87.  GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 15. 
88.  Id. at 16. 
89.  3 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 473-74 
(1962) [hereinafter MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY]; RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840, at 128 (1969) (stating that Jefferson was 
understood to be the presidential candidate). 
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Federalists, concluding that Jefferson was the lesser evil, 
abstained to allow his election.90  The Jeffersonians 
changed the system in 1804, right before that year’s 
election, by securing ratification of the Twelfth Amendment 
that separated the elections of President and Vice 
President.91 
In essence, practice had deviated from original 
design.  In different ways, Hamilton and James Madison 
had been architects and proponents of the initial electoral 
system that envisioned electors using discretion to cast 
two votes independently of national coordination and 
pressure.  Yet they also were creators and implementers 
of the national party system that undermined the very 
presidential election system Hamilton had endorsed as “at 
least excellent.”92  The parties constructed tickets, slotted 
candidates for President and Vice President, and urged 
electors to vote the party line not use discretion (although 
Adams suspected Hamilton of scheming to manipulate 
things so the Pinckneys would outpoll him93).  The 
creation of national political parties undermined the 
Framers’ design.94  I am aware of no record that Hamilton 
or Madison resisted the practice of running national tickets 
and encouraging partisan support for both members as 
offensive to the original intent or meaning of the 
Constitution.  Instead, their commitment to the original 
design succumbed to partisan expediency.  Once it was 
clear that the design was not working as intended, neither 
they, nor most others, insisted on sticking to it.  They 
 
90.  MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY, supra note 89, at 504. 
91.  KURODA, supra note 74, at 155-161; 4 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 393-395 (1970) [hereinafter MALONE, 
JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT]. 
92.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 56, at 414. 
93.  CHERNOW, supra note 86, at 511, 515-516, 612, 617-618; STANLEY 
ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 734-738 (1993).   
94.   DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 
1801-1829, at 39 (2001) (“The growth of political parties had wrecked the Framers’ 
well-laid plans.”).  Just as Madison’s thinking on the Presidential Election Clause 
evolved, so, too, did his thinking on the constitutionality of Congress creating the 
Bank of the United States.  See KILLENBECK, supra note 35, at 19-21 (discussing 
Madison’s constitutional arguments against establishment of the First Bank which 
drew on original history); id. at 60-61 (discussing Madison’s later change in 
constitutional position based on ongoing history); id. at 63 (reporting Madison’s 
considerations in signing bill creating Second Bank). 
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disregarded original history and developed divergent 
practice to accommodate better reasoning. 
Ultimately, of course, the Twelfth Amendment 
changed the presidential election system pursuant to the 
constitutionally prescribed amendment procedure.95  It did 
so because the practice of running a party ticket for 
President and Vice President had deviated from original 
design.  Indeed, the Jeffersonians feared that under the 
original system the new practice would allow the 
Federalist minority to deal with the Democrat-Republican 
vice presidential candidate to defeat Jefferson.96  In 
creating a new presidential election system, the Twelfth 
Amendment design followed the logic of that new practice 
by separating the presidential and vice-presidential 
elections.97 
B. The President of the Senate Clause 
A second constitutional clause where practice 
diverged from original intent involved the President of the 
Senate Clause, although the change took much longer 
than the departure from the original electoral design and 
occurred informally without a constitutional amendment or 
statutory intervention.98  The President of the Senate 
Clause provides that “[t]he Vice President of the United 
States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no 
Vote, unless they be equally divided.”99  In fact, as 
Williamson said, the Vice President “was not wanted” and 
some delegates, including Elbridge Gerry, later the fifth 
Vice President, opposed creating the office or making its 
occupant the Senate’s presiding officer.100  But Roger 
 
95.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
96.  KURODA, supra note 74, at 118, 155-57; MALONE, JEFFERSON THE 
PRESIDENT, supra note 91, at 393-95. 
97.  See MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT, supra note 91, at 393-94. 
98.  See generally Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 382-
94 (providing a more comprehensive discussion of the Vice President’s role as 
President of Senate). 
99.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
100.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 78, 
at 536-37 (discussing Gerry opposing creating the Vice President); id. at 537 
(discussing Randolph opposing making the Vice President the President of the 
Senate); id. (discussing Mason opposing making the Vice President the President 
of the Senate). 
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Sherman pointed out that if the Vice President “were not to 
be President of the Senate, he would be without 
employment” and a senator would have to sacrifice his 
state’s equal suffrage in order to be a fair presiding 
officer.101  On September 7, 1787, the Convention voted, 
eight states to two states, to designate the Vice President 
as President of the Senate.102 
 As “President of the Senate” the Vice President was 
to preside regularly over that body.103  The Clause as 
originally drafted made that clear.104  Senator Oliver 
Ellsworth of Connecticut, a constitutional expert of the 
founding period and an influential drafter of the 
Constitution at the Philadelphia convention, told John 
Adams, our first Vice President, without noted dissent that 
he was obliged to preside whenever the Senate met105 
and Adams acted upon this view.106  His successor, 
Jefferson, also treated presiding over the Senate as his 
regular duty.107  The President of the Senate Clause 
assigns the Vice President’s only explicit ongoing 
constitutional duty, a reality Adams implied when he said, 
“I am Vice President, in this I am nothing . . . but I am 
 
101.  Id. at 537. 
102.  Id. at 532, 538. 
103.  See Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 390-91. 
104.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 78, 
at 498 (“The vice-president shall be ex officio President of the Senate, except when 
they sit to try the impeachment of the President, in which case the Chief Justice 
shall preside, and excepting also when he shall exercise the powers and duties of 
President, in which case & in case of his absence, the Senate shall chose a 
President pro tempore.  The vice President when acting as President of the Senate 
shall not have a vote unless the House be equally divided.”). 
105.  9 THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE 
DEBATES 6 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988) [hereinafter THE DIARY 
OF WILLIAM MACLAY] (“I find Sir, it is evident & Clear Sir, that wherever . . . the 
Senate is to be, then Sir you must be at the head of them.”). 
106.  Letter from Abigail Adams to Mary Smith Cranch (July 4, 1790), in 9 
ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 73-74 (Margaret A. Hogan et al. eds., 2009) 
(complaining that John Adams constantly presided over Senate). 
107.  6 ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 1580-1582 (1797); 
MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY, supra note 89, at 300 (stating 
that Jefferson regarded his duties as purely legislative); id. at 452-53 (reporting 
that Jefferson took his presiding duties “seriously”); see also Goldstein, 
Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 391. 
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President also of the Senate.”108  The ongoing Senate 
assignment juxtaposed with simply a contingent executive 
role led most to characterize the Vice President as a 
legislative, not an executive, figure.  After all, as Sherman 
said, without the Senate gig the Vice President would be 
unemployed.109  Although some framers expressed the 
view that the vice presidency improperly blended 
executive and legislative powers,110 Adams and Jefferson 
both conceived of the office as entirely legislative.111 
The apparent original intent, understanding, and 
meaning of the President of the Senate Clause was that 
the Vice President’s duty was to preside over the 
Senate.112  For most of American history that interpretation 
guided behavior.  To be sure, there were occasions when 
the vice presidency was vacant or when Vice Presidents 
were absent, due to bad health or neglect, but most Vice 
Presidents took this constitutional obligation seriously.113  
Indeed, in 1920 Thomas Marshall, Woodrow Wilson’s Vice 
President, opposed the Vice President sitting with the 
Cabinet as inconsistent with the constitutional obligation to 
preside over the Senate.114  Most of the first thirty-five Vice 
Presidents, from Adams to Alben Barkley (1949-1953), 
regularly presided over the Senate.115 
 
108.  9 THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE 
DEBATES, supra note 105, at 6. 
109.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 78, 
at 537. 
110.  See Roy E. Brownell, II, A Constitutional Chameleon: The Vice 
President’s Place Within the American System of Separation of Powers: Part 1: 
Text, Structure, Views of the Framers and the Courts, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 
58-61 (2014) [hereinafter Brownell, II, Part I]. 
111.  Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 389-90; see also 
Roy E. Brownell, II, A Constitutional Chameleon: The Vice President’s Place 
Within the American System of Separation of Powers: Part II: Political Branch 
Interpretation and Counterarguments, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 294, 301-302, 
310-313 (2015) [hereinafter Brownell, II, Part II]. 
112.  Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 390-92. 
113.  See, e.g., Harold C. Relyea, The Executive Office of the Vice President: 
Constitutional and Legal Considerations, 40 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 327, 327-28 
(2010) (reporting that Vice Presidents generally presided over Senate for first 
century and one half). 
114.  Marshall Opposed to Seat in Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1920, at 4. 
115.  GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 16, 
21-22 (reporting that Vice Presidents generally presided over Senate through 
Barkley). 
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Yet practice began to revise constitutional 
prescription.  Most Vice Presidents beginning with Calvin 
Coolidge (1921-1923) began to meet regularly with the 
President’s Cabinet.116  Henry Wallace (1941-1945) 
headed executive councils and undertook some diplomatic 
assignments which took him away from the Senate and 
Washington, D.C. for extended periods.117 Changes in 
American politics and government created a new context 
in which the vice presidency was drawn from the 
legislative to the executive branch.  The increased 
demands on the presidency occasioned by the New Deal 
and World War II created more work in the executive 
branch.118  The Cold War heightened the need for a 
prepared successor, a development which in 1949 caused 
Congress to add the Vice President to the National 
Security Council (NSC), a body otherwise consisting of 
executive branch officials.119  Vice Presidents still presided 
over the Senate on a regular basis through Barkley but a 
few also did some minor executive chores.120 
The vice presidency of Richard M. Nixon (1953-1961) 
propelled the office towards the executive branch.121  
Nixon spent little time presiding over the Senate.122  A few 
years after leaving the second office, Nixon testified that 
presiding over the Senate was the Vice President’s “least 
burdensome duty.”123  Nixon instead attended 
 
116.  Id. at 20-21; Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, 395-96; 
see also Brownell, II, Part I, supra note 110, at 319-21 (presenting some earlier 
instances when Vice Presidents met on occasional basis with Cabinet); Brownell, 
II, Part II, supra note 111, at 324-29 (reporting some executive activities of earlier 
Vice Presidents). 
117.  MARK O. HATFIELD, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-
1993, at 401-04 (Wendy Wolff ed., 1997).  
118.  JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 15-45, 140-42, 301-08 (1982) 
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY]. 
119.  See id. at 140. 
120.  See GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 
20-22. 
121.   Id. at 25; Albert, supra note 75, at 833; Brownell, II, Part I, supra note 
110, at 342-43; Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 397-98. 
122.  GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 118, 
at 142. 
123.  Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 245 (1964) (statement of Richard Nixon). 
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Eisenhower’s regular Cabinet, NSC, and meetings with 
Republican legislative leaders, took seven diplomatic trips 
as the President’s representative, headed executive 
branch commissions, and handled political work for the 
administration.124  Writing in the 1950s, Edward Corwin 
described the vice presidency as having undergone 
“something of a renaissance” in the twentieth century125 
with the “significant changes [] centered on its executive 
side” such that Nixon regarded “his executive role as 
higher in obligation and importance than his legislative 
role.”126 
In March 1961, the Department of Justice recognized 
that practice had revised the original conception of the 
vice presidency.127  It opined that during the prior fifty 
years and especially since 1933, the vice presidency “has 
moved closer and closer to the Executive.”128  The Vice 
President could now “engage in activities ranging into the 
highest levels of diplomacy” anywhere in the world as the 
President’s representative.129  The constitutional duty to 
preside over the Senate was not an obstacle to such travel 
because the Vice President’s “lengthy absences” from the 
Senate “have become the custom and not the 
exception.”130  Similarly, the domestic assignments to the 
Vice President that were advisory or subordinate to the 
President posed no constitutional impediment.131  The 
Department of Justice relied heavily on practice in shaping 
the Vice President’s status even when that practice 
 
124.  See generally IRWIN F. GELLMAN, THE PRESIDENT AND THE APPRENTICE: 
EISENHOWER AND NIXON, 1953-1961 (2015) (describing the many executive duties 
that Richard Nixon took on as Vice President).  See also GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN 
AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 118, at 152, 159, 163, 167-68, 178, 184-
85, 190-91; GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 25. 
125.  EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, 
at 61 (4th ed. 1957). 
126.  Id. at 67. 
127.  See Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Participation of the Vice President in the Affairs of 
the Exec. Branch 214-23 (Mar. 9, 1961), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1961/03/31/op-olc-supp-
v001-p0214.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QQE-TYUZ]. 
128.  Id. at 219-20. 
129.  Id. at 220. 
130.  Id. 
131.  See id. at 222-23. 
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conflicted with the text and original constitutional 
expectations. 
John F. Kennedy gave Lyndon Johnson an office in 
the Executive Office Building,132 which his successors 
retained,133 and assignments similar to those Nixon 
handled.134  As President, Johnson named Hubert H. 
Humphrey to numerous commission chairmanships and 
sent him on foreign missions.135  Nixon gave Spiro T. 
Agnew similar responsibilities and named him to head an 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.136  
In so doing, he was supported by an opinion from William 
H. Rehnquist as head of the Department of Justice’s 
Office of Legal Counsel, which reasoned that based on 
precedents from the three immediately preceding 
administrations the Vice President’s status could be 
viewed as executive depending on the context.137  Like his 
recent predecessors, Gerald R. Ford performed some 
executive and political tasks during his brief vice 
presidency138 and, as President, named Nelson A. 
Rockefeller the head of the Domestic Council and the 
chair of an executive branch inquiry into abuses of the 
Central Intelligence Agency among other assignments.139 
Although original history obligated the Vice President to 
preside over the Senate,140 and although Vice Presidents 
performed that duty pretty regularly until 1953, by 1976 a new 
practice of ignoring the duty to preside over the Senate had 
 
132.  Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 398. 
133.  Id. at 399. 
134.  See, e.g., Robert Dallek, Frustration and Pain: Lyndon B. Johnson as 
Vice President, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 88, 88-100 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997). 
135.  See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, More Agony than Ecstasy: Hubert H. 
Humphrey as Vice President, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE VICE PRESIDENCY 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 103, 107, 112-13, 115-16 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997). 
136.  JULES WITCOVER, VERY STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: THE SHORT AND 
UNHAPPY MARRIAGE OF RICHARD NIXON & SPIRO AGNEW 58, 221 (2007). 
137.  See Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Honorable Edward L. Morgan, Deputy Counsel to 
the President, Advisory Comm’n on Intergovernmental Relations 2 (Feb. 7, 1969). 
138.  See James Cannon, Gerald R. Ford and Nelson A. Rockefeller: A Vice-
Presidential Memoir, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 135, 135-37 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997). 
139.  Id. at 139-41. 
140.  Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 390-92. 
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replaced the old and made that original duty a rare, not regular, 
occupation.141  The new practice, which began with Nixon, was 
reinforced by the imitation of his successors from 1953 to 
1977.142  The repeated vice presidential absence from the Senate 
acquiesced in by that body had transformed the constitutional 
words “President of the Senate” from an obligation to simply a 
title and a right to be exercised at the Vice President’s 
discretion.  Although practice had reinforced the original design 
for nearly a century and two-thirds, those two historical supports 
were insufficient to prevent the vice presidency from moving to 
the executive branch and abandoning the Senate presiding role 
when prudence so dictated. 
C. The Original Vice Presidential Succession Clause 
In addition to the ongoing duty to preside over the 
Senate, the Constitution made the Vice President the first 
presidential successor.143  For most of American history, it 
has been understood that when a President dies, resigns 
or is removed from office, the Vice President becomes 
President.144  Yet the original intent and public meaning of 
the original Constitution, to the extent it can be recovered, 
seemed to envision a more modest status for the Vice 
President in those three situations (i.e., death, resignation, 
removal) involving a President’s permanent departure 
from his office.145  Specifically, original history seemed to 
suggest that the Vice President would simply act as, but 
not become, President following such an event, or a 
presidential inability, and would do so only until the 
inability was removed or a new President was chosen, 
perhaps by a special election.146  Once again, a divergent 
historical practice developed and it pushed constitutional 
interpretation in a different direction. 
 
141.  GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 118, 
at 142 (discussing how infrequently Vice Presidents preside over the Senate). 
142.  See id. at 142. 
143.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
144.  GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 118, 
at 203-05. 
145.  See id.  
146.  See id. 
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Some evidence of the original intent of the Vice 
Presidential Succession Clause is suggested by the draft 
the Philadelphia Convention approved in early September 
1787 and sent to the Committee on Style.147  It read, in 
pertinent part, as follows:  “[I]n case of his removal as 
aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or inability to 
discharge the powers or duties of his office the Vice 
President shall exercise those powers and duties until 
another President be chosen, or until the inability of the 
President be removed.”148  Significantly, the clause made 
clear that the Vice President simply “exercise[d]” 
presidential powers and duties rather than becoming 
President.  Moreover, the clause, and its drafting history, 
emphasized that the Vice President was not a full 
President by suggesting that the Vice President’s exercise 
was subject to two potential limits other than the end of the 
term for which he was elected.  In addition to removal of 
the President’s inability, the Vice President’s exercise of 
presidential powers would end when “another President 
[was] chosen,” language that was intended to allow for a 
special election.149 
The Committee of Style modified that language 
essentially to its present form in two ways which obscured 
the intended meaning.  It changed the language regarding 
what happened following presidential continuity 
contingencies to read as follows:  “In case of the removal 
of the president from office, or of his death, resignation, or 
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said 
office, the same shall devolve on the vice-
president . . . .”150  This modification introduced an 
ambiguity in the Clause, at least when read alone, since it 
became less clear whether “the same” referred to the 
office of President devolving (in which case the Vice 
President became the President) or simply “the powers 
and duties of the said Office” in which case the Vice 
 
147.  JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION 48 (1965). 
148.  Quoted in id. (emphasis added by Feerick). 
149.  Id. at 46-47, 49-50. 
150.  Id. at 48. 
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President exercised presidential powers and duties while 
retaining his prior station.151 
The Committee also combined the similar language 
which had modified the proposed Vice Presidential 
Succession Clause152 and the Officer Succession 
Clause153 into a single clause.154  Previously, each clause 
provided that the Vice President, or officer Congress 
designated as the next successor, acted as President until 
a new President was elected or the President’s (or in the 
latter case, the President’s or Vice President’s) disability 
was removed.155 
The authority of the Committee on Style was simply 
“to revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to by 
the [Convention],” not to modify its substance.156  The 
prior history would suggest that what “devolve[d]” was the 
“Powers and Duties of the said Office,” not the office 
itself.157  Further evidence of the framers’ intent comes 
from a fragment of the Federalist Papers where Alexander 
Hamilton wrote that the Vice President might occasionally 
 
151.  Id. at 48, 50. 
152.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 78, 
at 575 (“[A]nd in case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or 
inability to discharge the powers or duties of his office the Vice President shall 
exercise those powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the 
inability of the President be removed.”). 
153.  Id. at 573 (“The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the 
United States shall act as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability 
of the President and Vice President; and such Officer shall act accordingly, until 
such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”). 
154.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President 
from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and 
Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the 
Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or 
Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then 
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be 
removed, or a President shall be elected.”). 
155.  The two clauses did use slightly different formulations.  The Vice 
Presidential Succession Clause provided that “the Vice President shall exercise 
those powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the inability of 
the President be removed.”  2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
supra note 78, at 573.  The Officer Succession Clause provided that “such Officer 
shall act accordingly, until such disability be removed, or a President shall be 
elected.”  Id. at 573. 
156.  Id. at 547; FEERICK, supra note 147, at 48; RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION 8 (1951). 
157.  SILVA, supra note 156, at 8-9; FEERICK, supra note 147, at 48, 50-51. 
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“become a substitute” for the President and be called on 
“to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the 
President.”158  Hamilton did not characterize the Vice 
President as becoming President or holding the office. 
Although the Vice Presidential Succession Clause 
might appear ambiguous when viewed alone, its original 
public meaning becomes more apparent when other 
constitutional language is considered.  Elsewhere the 
Constitution itself suggests that following a permanent or 
temporary presidential vacancy, the Vice President simply 
acts as, but does not become, President.  For instance, 
the Senate President Pro Tempore Clause provides that 
the Senate elects such an officer to preside over it when 
the Vice President is absent, or when he “shall exercise 
the Office of President of the United States,” not when he 
shall “hold” the presidency.159  Moreover, the formulation 
that the Vice President “shall exercise the Office of 
President of the United States” suggests that he remains 
Vice President rather than becoming President.  Other 
constitutional language makes it even clearer that the Vice 
President’s status was as Vice President acting as 
President, not as President.  The Twelfth Amendment, 
which was ratified in 1804, states that if the House of 
Representatives does not elect a President before the new 
term begins “the Vice-President shall act as President, as 
in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of 
the President.”160  The clause makes clear that in cases of 
“death or other constitutional disability of the President” 
the Vice President simply acts as President.  Leading 
scholars who have studied the issue have concluded that 
the original intent of the Constitution was to empower the 
Vice President simply to discharge the powers and duties 
of the President temporarily, not to become President and 
to make him subject to having that exercise ended by a 
special election.161 
 
158.   FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 56, at 415.  
159.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their other 
Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, 
or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.”). 
160.  U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
161.  FEERICK, supra note 147, at 50-51, 55-56; See also CORWIN, supra note 
125, at 54; SILVA, supra note 156, at 8-10, 13. 
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Yet when William Henry Harrison died on April 4, 
1841, one month into his presidency, his Vice President, 
John Tyler, insisted that he was President, not simply Vice 
President acting as President.162  Tyler took the oath of 
office as President as a precaution, although he thought 
his vice presidential oath was sufficient.163  Some have 
suggested that the logic of Tyler’s position would seem to 
suggest that he initially thought he was simply Vice 
President acting as President,164 especially since the 
Constitution requires that a President take the presidential 
oath “[b]efore he enter on the execution of his office.”165  
In any event, taking the presidential oath constitutes a 
claim to the presidency since it is a prerequisite for the 
President to exercise “his” office.  Three days later, Tyler 
delivered an inaugural address in which he declared that 
the “Presidential office” had devolved upon him.166  Not 
everyone agreed. 167  Representative (and former 
President) John Quincy Adams complained that Tyler 
“styles himself President of the United States, and not 
Vice-President acting as President, which would be the 
correct style.”168  Adams thought Tyler’s view was a “direct 
violation both of the grammar and context of the 
Constitution,” which in such situations gave the Vice 
 
162.  FEERICK, supra note 147, at 90-93. 
163.  FEERICK, supra note 147, at 92 (“I, William Cranch, chief judge of the 
circuit court of the District of Columbia, certify that the above-named John Tyler 
personally appeared before me this day, and although he deems himself qualified 
to perform the duties and exercise the powers and office of President on the death 
of William Henry Harrison, late President of the United States, without any other 
oath than that which he has taken as Vice-President, yet as doubts may arise, and 
for greater caution, took and subscribed the foregoing oath before me. W. 
CRANCH. APRIL 6, 1841.”). 
164.  CORWIN, supra note 125, at 54. 
165.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“Before he enter on the Execution of his 
Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—‘I do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and 
will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.’”). 
166.  FEERICK, supra note 147, at 93 (“For the first time in our history the 
person elected to the Vice-Presidency of the United States, by the happening of a 
contingency provided for in the Constitution, has had devolved upon him the 
Presidential office.”). 
167.  SILVA, supra note 156, at 20-22; FEERICK, supra note 147, at 94-96. 
168.  10 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS 
DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, 463 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1876). 
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President not the presidency but simply its powers and 
duties.169  When Congress convened on May 31, 1841, 
some members of both houses moved that Tyler be 
addressed as Vice President who was acting as 
President.170  After debate, the issue was resolved in 
Tyler’s favor in the House of Representatives and thirty-
eight to eight in the Senate.171 
Nine years later, when President Zachary Taylor died, 
his Vice President, Millard Fillmore, followed Tyler’s 
example and immediately announced plans to take the 
presidential oath.172  The Tyler Precedent was also 
followed when Vice Presidents Andrew Johnson, Chester 
A. Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry S. 
Truman and Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded to the 
presidency after the deaths of their predecessors.173  Tyler 
and these other seven Presidents by succession were 
recognized as being Presidents, not simply acting as such 
while completing a vice-presidential term.174 
The Tyler Precedent conflicted with the Constitution’s 
original intent175 and a textualist or originalist would have 
resisted its validity.  Ruth C. Silva, for instance, attributed 
the presidential status of the Vice Presidents who 
succeeded a deceased President from 1841 to 1945176 to 
“usage” not “constitutional provision” and argued that “long 
acquiescence of Congress and the Executive does not 
make constitutional that which is unconstitutional.”177  Yet 
the better view recognized repeated historical usage as 
capable of establishing constitutional meaning.  Chief 
 
169.   Id. at 463-64. 
170.  FEERICK, supra note 147, at 95. 
171.  Id. at 95-96. 
172.  Reply of Mr. Fillmore to the Announcement of the Death of President 
Taylor, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 9, 1850), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68106 [https://perma.cc/SP4V-R5SQ]. 
173.  See SILVA, supra note 156, at 27-37 (discussing Tyler Precedent 
applying to Johnson, Arthur, T. Roosevelt, F. D. Roosevelt, Coolidge, and 
Truman). 
174.  SILVA, supra note 156, at 27-37 (regarding Tyler Precedent being 
followed by Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Roosevelt, Coolidge, and Truman). 
175.  Id. at 31.   
176.  Silva’s book was written in 1951 before the Kennedy-Johnson 
succession.   
177.  SILVA, supra note 156, at 47-48. 
2016] CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 675 
Justice Marshall had so suggested in McCulloch v. 
Maryland178 and other Court opinions also recognized the 
validity of this method of constitutional interpretation.179  
Notwithstanding the apparent original intent that the Vice 
President would simply act as President following the 
death of the chief executive, the repeated historical 
practice of eight Presidents becoming President resolved 
the issue.180  The Tyler Precedent foreclosed any 
possibility of a special election when a vice president 
succeeded following an intraterm presidential vacancy.  If 
the Vice President became President, he was entitled to 
complete the presidential term. 
D. The Tyler Precedent and Presidential Inability 
The Tyler Precedent presented another problem.  The 
Constitution’s text and its original intent and public 
meaning suggested that whatever passed to the Vice 
President following the President’s death, resignation or 
removal also passed to him when the President was 
disabled.  After all, identical language—”the Same shall 
devolve on the Vice President”—applied to all four 
contingencies of presidential death, resignation, removal 
and inability.181  If the Vice President became President 
 
178.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819) (“But it is conceived 
that a doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause, and the human 
judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great principles of liberty are 
not concerned, but the respective powers of those who are equally the 
representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practice 
of the Government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that 
practice.”). 
179.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595, 610-12 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (recognizing ongoing practice as shaping 
constitutional meaning).  But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“[O]ur 
inquiry is sharpened, rather than blunted, by the fact that congressional veto 
provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate 
authority to executive and independent agencies . . . .”). 
180.  CORWIN, supra note 125, at 54 (explaining “Tyler’s exploit, however, 
having been repeated six times, must today be regarded as having become law of 
the land” even though contrary to original intent); Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, 
Attorney Gen., to President John F. Kennedy 23, 36 (undated), 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-080-015.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/8U2U-68SV].  These sources were, of course, written before the 
Kennedy assassination in 1963.   
181.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
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following a presidential death, as the Tyler Precedent 
provided, the semantic logic dictated that he also became 
President upon the occurrence of a presidential inability. 
The textual symmetry concealed a problem.  
Presidential death, resignation and removal created 
permanent vacancies, but a presidential inability might be 
only temporary.  If a presidential inability caused the 
presidency to devolve, then presumably the disabled 
President would be forever ousted from office even upon a 
transient incapacity.  That conclusion seemed to follow 
from the Executive Vesting Clause182 which assigned 
“executive Power” to “a President of the United States,” 
not multiple ones.  Yet it was not difficult to imagine short-
term situations in which a President might not be able to 
discharge essential presidential powers and duties, which 
required immediate attention.  The need for presidential 
response might require devolution to the Vice President, 
but it seemed unduly harsh and undemocratic for the 
President to lose office upon a temporary incapacity. 
History presented that issue forty years after the Tyler 
Precedent when President James Garfield was shot on 
July 2, 1881.183  He performed essentially no executive 
duties during the eighty days between the shooting and 
his death.184  Neither did Vice President Chester A. 
Arthur.185  Garfield and Arthur represented rival political 
wings in the Republican Party.186  Although the 
“predominant view” was that a Vice President could act as 
President temporarily pending the President’s recovery,187 
“[a] not inconsiderable body of opinion” thought that a 
vice-presidential assumption of presidential authority 
would occasion a permanent succession.188  The 
uncertainty prevented the Cabinet from inviting Arthur to 
act as President although its members all thought that 
 
182.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.”). 
183.   FEERICK, supra note 147, at 118. 
184.  SILVA, supra note 156, at 52-53. 
185.  Id. at 54.  
186.  FEERICK, supra note 147, at 120-21. 
187.  Id. at 134. 
188.  Id. at 133. 
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desirable.189  Arthur was reluctant to act, fearing he would 
be viewed a usurper, and the Cabinet refrained from 
discussing the matter with Garfield given his precarious 
condition.190  No transfer of power occurred to Vice 
President Thomas Marshall after Woodrow Wilson 
suffered a stroke in 1919, which essentially disabled him 
for much or all of the remaining seventeen-plus months of 
his term.191  It is not clear the extent to which concerns 
about permanently displacing Wilson affected matters.192  
On one occasion, Wilson’s secretary, Joe Tumulty, 
associated efforts by Cabinet members to discuss inability 
as tantamount to “ousting” Wilson, and Wilson used the 
same suggestive terminology.193  It seems more likely that 
the intransigence of Wilson and First Lady Edith Bolling 
Wilson stemmed from personal and ideological 
commitments in addition to the constitutional 
ambiguities.194 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered three 
serious illnesses during the early years of the Cold War 
and nuclear age, an experience that perhaps encouraged 
him to take the problem of presidential inability quite 
seriously.  After the second illness, Eisenhower had 
discussions with Nixon to address the possibility of a 
presidential inability which resulted in a remarkable letter 
agreement between them.195  It allowed either Eisenhower 
or Nixon to determine that Eisenhower was disabled at 
which point Nixon would act as President until Eisenhower 
decided he was able to discharge presidential powers and 
duties again.196 
 
189.  SILVA, supra note 156, at 55-56. 
190.  FEERICK, supra note 147, at 135-138. 
191.  Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-Presidential Behavior in a Disability Crisis, 33 
POL. & LIFE SCI. 37, 37-38, 45 (2014). 
192.  See id. at 45-49. 
193.  FEERICK, supra note 147, at 170, 178-79. 
194.  See Goldstein, Vice-Presidential Behavior in a Disability Crisis, supra 
note 191, at 37, 39-40, 42-44. 
195.  SHERMAN ADAMS, FIRSTHAND REPORT: THE STORY OF THE EISENHOWER 
ADMINISTRATION 198, 228-29 (1961). 
196.  Id. at 199; FEERICK, supra note 147, at 228. 
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Eisenhower memorialized their arrangement in a 
letter to Nixon on February 5, 1958.197  He referred to the 
“differences of opinion as to the exact meaning of that 
feature of the Constitution which provides that the Vice 
President will have the powers and the duties of the 
President when the President is unable to discharge 
them.”198  The perceived “differences of opinion” to which 
Eisenhower referred apparently related only to how the 
disability decision should be made, not whether a 
presidential inability ousted the President.  Eisenhower 
acknowledged no uncertainty on that question.199  In case 
of a presidential inability Eisenhower implicitly interpreted 
the Constitution to transfer simply the powers and duties 
of the presidency, not the office itself, thereby deeming the 
Tyler Precedent inapplicable to presidential inability.200 
In the letter, Eisenhower identified some types of 
inability that could occur such as “disease or accident that 
would prevent the President from making important 
decisions,” “a failure of communications,” “uncertainty 
about the whereabouts of the President,” among others.201  
Eisenhower thought an agreement with Nixon could 
eliminate doubts and authorize Nixon to act without 
embarrassment or resistance from Eisenhower’s 
associates.202  Eisenhower even stated that if “any group 
of distinguished medical authorities” that Nixon assembled 
concluded Eisenhower’s disability was permanent, he 
would resign but if he did not, Nixon should assume the 
presidency and move into the White House.203  Otherwise, 
 
197.  Letter from Eisenhower to Nixon (Feb. 5, 1958), in 19 THE PAPERS OF 
DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER 711, 711-13 (Louis Galambos & Daun Van Ee eds., 
2001).  
198.  Id. at 711-12. 
199.  See ADAMS, supra note 195, at 199-200 (Eisenhower’s Attorney 
General, Cabinet, and the Justice Department had trouble determining a 
procedure to follow in the case of presidential inability.  In any event, “Eisenhower 
said he was convinced that a President should be able under the Constitution to 
take himself temporarily out of office by his own statement of disability and resume 
office by a similar statement of his own competence.”). 
200.  See Letter from Eisenhower to Nixon (Feb. 5, 1958), supra note 197, at 
711-12. 
201.  Id. at 712. 
202.  Id. at 712-13. 
203.  Id. at 713. 
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Nixon would simply act “for the necessary period” as Vice 
President and as “Acting President.”204  Eisenhower 
favored a constitutional amendment along these general 
lines but no consensus developed in Congress regarding 
a resolution during his service.205 
The Eisenhower-Nixon arrangement did not apply the 
Tyler Precedent in symmetrical fashion to presidential 
inability as constitutional formalism would suggest.  To do 
so would have exalted semantic logic while ignoring the 
practical differences between situations causing 
permanent and temporary gaps in presidential continuity 
and the practical problems symmetry would introduce.  In 
particular, as the Garfield experience suggested, 
Presidents would be less likely to transfer—and Vice 
Presidents would be less likely to claim—presidential 
power if they thought such action would shift the 
presidency permanently, not simply its powers and duties 
temporarily.  Rather than accept that the original meaning 
mandated symmetrical treatment or attack the Tyler 
Precedent, Eisenhower took a pragmatic approach to 
resolve the constitutional issue in a way sensitive to the 
consequences of the solution. 
The Eisenhower-Nixon approach was followed by the 
next three President-first successor pairs:  Kennedy-
Johnson, Johnson-Speaker John McCormack, and 
Johnson-Hubert H. Humphrey.206  Attorney General 
Robert F. Kennedy concurred in opinions by his two 
immediate predecessors, Eisenhower’s two attorneys 
general, that a presidential inability simply caused the 
presidential powers and duties, not the office, to transfer to 
the Vice President and that the President retained power 
to reclaim them.207  He recommended that his brother’s 
administration follow the Eisenhower-Nixon precedent 
since “this understanding may prove to be a persuasive 
precedent of what the Constitution means until it is 
amended . . . Cumulative precedents of this kind may be 
 
204.  Id. 
205.  FEERICK, supra note 147, at 239, 242. 
206.  Id. at 228-29. 
207.  Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney Gen., to President John F. 
Kennedy, supra note 180, at 1-2. 
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valuable in the future.”208  Repetition helped exclude 
instances of presidential inability from the Tyler Precedent 
and accordingly allowed Presidents to formulate means to 
transfer power temporarily that passed constitutional 
muster. 
Although three consecutive Presidents—Eisenhower, 
Kennedy and Johnson—felt comfortable in providing for 
the temporary transfer of presidential powers and duties to 
four successors—Nixon, Johnson, McCormack and 
Humphrey—the letter agreement route was criticized as 
not having the force of law and depending on the goodwill 
between the top two officers209 and a need for a 
constitutional solution was perceived.210 
During the mid-1960s, Congress finally acted to 
provide for presidential continuity in a formal and more 
comprehensive way.211  The Kennedy assassination on 
November 22, 1963, and the legislative leadership of 
Senator Birch Bayh were among the factors that finally 
produced a solution in the form of a constitutional 
amendment.212  The Twenty-fifth Amendment contained 
four sections.213  The first adopted the Tyler Precedent for 
cases of presidential death, resignation, and removal, but 
not for disability.  Section two provided that whenever the 
vice presidency fell vacant the President could nominate a 
new Vice President who took office once confirmed by a 
majority of each house of Congress.  Sections three and 
four dealt with the vexing problems of presidential inability 
by authorizing, and providing procedures for, a temporary 
transfer of presidential powers and duties to the Vice 
President who would act as President.  The Amendment 
also made clear that the President would retain the office 
 
208.  Id. at 35. 
209.  FEERICK, supra note 147, at 246. 
210.  HERBERT BROWNELL WITH JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS 
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 279 (1993). 
211.  Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in 
Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 963 (2010) [hereinafter 
Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment]. 
212.  Id. at 964-65, 1006-07. 
213.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.  See generally JOHN D. FEERICK, THE 
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS (3rd ed. 
2013) (describing the historical background and implementation of the Twenty-fifth 
amendment).  
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and resume the powers and duties when able to do so 
(although subject to different provisions depending on 
whether the transfer was voluntary or involuntary).214  
Congress proposed the Amendment in 1965 and the 
necessary states completed the ratification process in 
1967.215 
I will return to the Twenty-fifth Amendment shortly.  
For now, it is worth noting that prior to the ratification of 
the Twenty-fifth Amendment the informal approach to 
handling presidential inability developed through the 
repetition of practices between three Presidents and four 
first successors over a twelve-year period.  Although the 
pre-1967 constitutional text, by language and intent, 
treated all four presidential continuity contingencies the 
same, practice, quite sensibly, separated presidential 
inability from the others based on prudential 




The foregoing discussion demonstrates that in 
virtually every respect the original constitutional design 
regarding the vice presidency yielded to different 
arrangements based on the repetition of informal 
practices.  The Tyler Precedent, the presidential-vice-
presidential inability arrangements, the demise of the 
President of the Senate role, and the executivization of the 
vice presidency all fit this description.  In some instances, 
repeated practice transformed the Constitution because it 
improved the framers’ product or responded to conditions 
not initially foreseen.  The movement of the vice 
presidency to the executive branch provides one example.  
Similarly, the initial presidential election system did not 
anticipate the rise of national parties and the appeal of 
ticket-balancing, and accordingly practice forced revision 
of the original design.  The Tyler Precedent was 
constitutionalized by practice, which quickly triumphed 
 
214.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3. 
215.  FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 213, at 104, 105. 
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over resistance; the difficulties it posed regarding 
presidential inability were initially resolved by 
Eisenhower’s prudential approach, which ignored the 
semantic problems it created. 
In interpreting and implementing constitutional 
provisions relating to vice-presidential election, conduct, 
and role in presidential succession and inability situations, 
political actors often departed from original history.  They 
did not, however, ignore history.  Instead, the history they 
used was often ongoing history as they followed prior 
practice in applying the relevant constitutional provisions, 
not the history surrounding the textual creation.  History 
guided constitutional interpretation, but the events political 
actors relied on were those that reflected ongoing practice 
and prudential judgments based on that experience, not 
those associated with the Constitution’s origins. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND THE 
VICE PRESIDENCY: STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS 
A surprising number of constitutional amendments 
have also influenced the development of the vice 
presidency, either by design or through unanticipated 
effects.  Four of the twenty-seven constitutional 
amendments, or about fifteen percent, have addressed the 
presidency, vice presidency or both.  And if one excludes 
the first ten amendments that were ratified immediately 
after the Constitution, those relating to the presidency 
and/or vice presidency grow to four of seventeen, or 
twenty-three percent.  The Twelfth Amendment changed 
the manner of electing Vice Presidents (and Presidents), 
the Twentieth and Twenty-fifth Amendments addressed 
presidential succession and inability, and the Twenty-
second Amendment imposed presidential term limits, a 
formal change that impacted the second office, too. A 
relatively high degree of the successful invocations of the 
Article V amendment process relate to the presidency and 
vice presidency. 
In most cases, these amendments responded to, and 
incorporated, historical practice.  For instance, the Twelfth 
Amendment took the practice of de facto stating a vice-
presidential candidate, which had occurred in prior 
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elections, and formally adopted it by requiring electors 
vote separately for President and Vice President. The 
Twenty-fifth Amendment adopted the Tyler Precedent for 
permanent presidential departures; the Eisenhower 
arrangement for voluntary presidential inabilities, a revised 
form of the Eisenhower approach for involuntary 
disabilities; and a variation of political practice, which 
recognized that presidential nominees chose their running 
mates, for the selection of a new Vice President.216  The 
Twenty-second Amendment formalized the two term 
tradition, which Presidents other than Franklin D. 
Roosevelt had followed.217 
These constitutional amendments have a structural 
significance that transcends the specific problems they 
addressed.  They also reshaped the constitutional 
structure in a way that contributes to a different 
constitutional vice presidency and presidency.  Each of the 
four amendments relating to the presidency and vice 
presidency not only changed prior constitutional provisions 
or spoke to subjects on which the Constitution had been 
silent, they also rested upon a different mix of ideas about 
the presidency, vice presidency, and other political 
institutions than had the Constitution as it previously 
existed.  In adding new ideas and patterns to the 
constitutional framework, they presented a way in which 
structural argument, the mode of constitutional reasoning 
for which McCulloch is most noted, is historical to an 
extent not often appreciated. 
Take the Twelfth Amendment.  Its principal objective 
was to prevent or at least significantly reduce the 
possibility that a de facto candidate for Vice President 
would end up as President, as almost happened in 1800 
with Burr.218  Separating the election of the President and 
Vice President largely accomplished that immediate goal.  
Yet the Amendment also had other impacts and 
introduced other ideas into the Constitution, or gave them 
 
216.  Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 211, at 
1002-03. 
217.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1; AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 74, at 433, 436. 
218.  GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 16. 
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added emphasis.  That change made it highly likely that 
the President and Vice President would come from the 
same ticket, thereby promoting philosophical and political 
compatibility between a President and Vice President and 
laying the foundation for the vice presidency to much later 
move to the executive branch.  It implicitly recognized 
political parties as a reality in American government.  
Formally, at least, it made explicit that the Vice President 
would be the vice-presidential winner, not the presidential 
runner-up.  Although some have blamed the Twelfth 
Amendment for reducing the quality of Vice Presidents219 
and encouraging ticket-balancing rather than excellence, it 
confirmed a trend already underway towards ticket-
construction220 and a number of subsequent Vice 
Presidents were quite distinguished.221  Yet the 
Amendment did suggest that candidates for Vice 
President were not subject to the same criteria as those 
for President.  A candidate for Vice President needed 
simply to be deemed suitable for the second office, not the 
first.222 
The Twentieth Amendment, which was ratified in 
1933, impacted the vice presidency in several ways.  It 
changed the Vice President’s term of office, by making it 
start and end on January 20 rather than March 4, thus 
reducing the time between the popular and electoral voting 
and the inauguration.223  It also provided that if a 
President-elect dies before the time he or she is to take 
office, the Vice President-elect becomes President at that 
time, but if he or she fails to qualify, the Vice President-
elect shall simply “act as President.”224  In so doing, it filled 
a gap in the original Constitution that provided for the 
 
219.  AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 74, at 343. 
220.  CURRIE, supra note 94, at 43; GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE 
PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 17-18. 
221.  GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 17-
18. 
222.  Whereas the original system formally called on electors to cast a ballot 
for two people for President, the Twelfth Amendment had the electors vote for one 
person he or she believes is qualified to be President and one he or she believes 
is qualified for Vice President. 
223.  U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. 
224.  U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3. 
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death of the President but not of the President-elect.  Yet 
in doing so, it also reflected a recognition of the 
importance of executive continuity.  Moreover, by 
providing that the Vice President-elect “become[s] 
President” upon the death of the President-elect, it applied 
the Tyler Precedent by constitutional amendment to that 
contingency while articulating a constitutional principle that 
the Vice President-elect should simply act as President 
during a potentially temporary vacancy.225  That structural 
principle might have provided an instructive analogy to 
inform the handling of presidential inability prior to the 
adoption of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.  Finally, by 
shortening the lame duck period and requiring Congress 
to meet each year on January 3, shortly before the 
President’s inauguration, the Twentieth Amendment 
probably strengthened the President’s position as a 
legislative leader. 
The Twenty-second Amendment, which imposed term 
limits on the President, did not directly address the vice 
presidency, but it impacted the second office in two 
respects.  By limiting the President’s ability to seek re-
election, it allowed a second-term Vice President to plan a 
presidential campaign without fear of offending or 
competing with the President.226  The Twenty-second 
Amendment, which was ratified in 1951, was not the only 
reason Nixon became the first Vice President nominated 
to seek the presidency in more than a century, but it eased 
his path.227  Along with the President’s selection of his 
running mate and the move of the vice presidency to the 
executive branch, the imposition of presidential term limits 
gave Presidents reason to see their Vice President as 
their best chance to extend their policies.  Moreover, the 
Amendment contributed structural arguments regarding 
presidential succession and inability.  It said that “no 
person who has held the office of President, or acted as 
 
225.  U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.  See also Albert, supra note 75, at 848-49 
(pointing out that Amendment confirms Tyler Precedent for succession by Vice 
President-elect following death of President-elect). 
226.  GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 118, 
at 255; Albert, supra note 75, at 856-57. 
227.  See GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 
26. 
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President, for more than two years of a term to which 
some other person was elected President” could be 
elected President more than once.228  The reference to 
persons holding the office during a term to which another 
was elected provided further confirmation of the Tyler 
Precedent.229  Finally, the Amendment reflected a concern 
regarding presidential power, which it addressed by 
limiting the length of presidential service notwithstanding 
democratic support for a particular incumbent.230 
The Twenty-fifth Amendment constitutionalized new 
ideas regarding the vice presidency, a topic I have 
discussed in much more detail in earlier works.231  
Contrary to the original Constitution which viewed the vice 
presidency as expendable once it helped produce a 
President,232  the Twenty-fifth Amendment reflected the 
idea that the Vice President was an indispensable 
governmental office that must be filled whenever it 
became vacant.233  The importance of the undertaking 
was such that Section 2 created a method that involved a 
considerable commitment of time by the executive branch 
and both houses of Congress.234 
 
228.  U.S. CONST. art. XXII, § 1. 
229.  The reference to persons who “act[ed] as President” apparently referred 
to an officer other than the Vice President who Congress designated to act as 
President during any type of presidential vacancy, whether caused by death, 
resignation, removal, inability or failure to qualify.  Succession to the Presidency: 
Hearing on S. Con. Res. 1 Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 80th Cong. 2-
3 (1947).   
230.  Albert, supra note 75, at 853 (“Fears of an imperial Presidency gave 
rise to the Twenty-Second Amendment.”). 
231.  Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 73, at 505; 
Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 211, at 963. 
232.  Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 73, at 512-
13.  The original Constitution communicated its ambivalence to the vice presidency 
by failing to provide a means to fill a vice-presidential vacancy.  Id. at 513, 515.  In 
fact, it underscored this disparaging attitude towards the second office in the 
Officer Succession Clause, which provided that if both the President and Vice 
President were vacant or incapacitated, Congress was empowered to designate 
an officer to fill the presidency.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.  No mention was 
made of filling the vice presidency, a silence that communicated the Constitution’s 
attitude that vice-presidential vacancy posed no peril.   
233.  Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 211, at 
981. 
234.  Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 73, at 526. 
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The drafters of the Twenty-fifth Amendment also saw 
the vice presidency as an executive, not a legislative 
office.235  Since the Vice President would be involved in 
the ongoing work of the executive branch and needed to 
be prepared to succeed if necessary,236  the President and 
Vice President should be compatible.237  Accordingly, the 
President should nominate someone to fill a vice-
presidential vacancy238 subject to congressional approval 
to simulate election and ensure competency.239  That 
approach provided further implicit recognition of the role of 
political parties in American government.240  The architects 
of the Twenty-fifth Amendment saw the Vice President as 
the best means to address the vexing problems that 
presidential succession and inability presented to 
presidential continuity.241  They thought the Vice President 
should become President following a permanent vacancy 
and should serve as such until the end of the presidential 
term underway.242  Although the Amendment reflected a 
new vision of the office, it focused on the office’s role as 
the first successor, a view underscored by the fact that 
each of the four provisions was directed to presidential 
succession, presidential inability or filling the vice 
presidency to best provide for presidential succession and 
inability. 
The impact of these Amendments on the 
Constitution’s structure has implications well beyond the 
vice presidency.  The Twelfth Amendment implicitly 
recognized the party system and in doing so, according to 
Akhil Reed Amar, “paved the way for increased 
involvement of ordinary citizens in the presidential-
 
235.  Id. at 530-32. 
236.  Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 211, at 
982-83. 
237.  Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 73, at 532-
33; Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 211, at 983. 
238.  Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 73, at 533-
34.  
239.  Id. at 534-36. 
240.  Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 211, at 
984. 
241.  Goldstein, New Constitutional Vice Presidency, supra note 73, 536-40. 
242.  Id. at 537. 
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selection process.”243  It also associated Presidents with 
partisan politics more directly.  The Twenty-fifth 
Amendment reinforced that recognition by incorporating 
the custom that the presidential nominee chooses a 
running mate as the model for Section 2.244  The 
Twentieth Amendment enhanced the President’s role as 
legislative leader by shortening the lame duck period and 
bringing Congress together before the beginning of a new 
presidential term.245  The Twenty-second Amendment 
constitutionalized the essential term-limit practice that 
Presidents other than Franklin Roosevelt had observed.246  
And the Twenty-fifth Amendment expressed the 
importance of presidential continuity247 (as does the 
Twentieth Amendment) but did so in a manner protective 
of the President’s entitlement to his office.248  It also 
expressed an appreciation of the need that the person 
next in line be well-prepared,249 that succession not shift 
party control of the White House,250 and that the 
successor be the product of a democratic and politically-
accountable selection process.251  It expressed a faith in 
pre-existing procedures and laws to guide behavior252 yet 
a recognition that results would depend upon the ability 
and willingness of officials to act in an appropriate 
manner.253 
Most discussions of structural argument draw from the 
original design in formulating conclusions.  Yet just as the 
Civil War Amendments affected the federal balance and 
the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, and 
 
243.  AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 74, at 342; see also Albert, 
supra note 75, at 842. 
244.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2; Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, supra note 211, at 984. 
245.  U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §§ 1-2. 
246.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
247.  Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 211, at 
981-82. 
248.  Id. at 982, 987-91. 
249.  Id. at 982-83.  
250.  Id. at 984. 
251.  Id. at 991-93. 
252.  See Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 
211, at 994-96. 
253.  Id. at 996-98. 
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Twenty-sixth Amendments altered ideas of democratic 
accountability, so, too, did the Twelfth, Twentieth, Twenty-
second, and Twenty-fifth Amendments modify the 
structure of the presidency.  Structural argument here, as 
elsewhere, cannot fairly proceed with reference simply to 
the original Constitution.  Rather, structural constitutional 
arguments must incorporate the textual provisions added 
to the document at different moments in American history.  
Like a building that is modified over a long life, the 
Constitution’s structure suggests themes from the addition 
of provisions over roughly two centuries.  The themes 
implicit in the Constitution, accordingly, draw from texts 
created at different times, not just in the late 1780s, and 
the interactions between those constitutional texts.  
Consequently, structural argument regarding the 
presidency or vice presidency involves a historical 
exercise, but one that looks not only at original but 
ongoing history.  The Constitution’s ideas regarding the 
presidency and the vice presidency come from looking not 
simply at the provisions in Article II, but at the four 
amendments added in 1804, 1933, 1951 and 1967 and 
the history relating to their production and 
implementation.254 
IV.  THE MOST RECENT CHAPTER 
The last forty years have demonstrated most 
dramatically how historical practice can reshape 
constitutional understandings, a theme I have developed 
in my recent book, The White House Vice Presidency: The 
Path to Significance, Mondale to Biden.255  In late 1976, 
President-elect Jimmy Carter and Vice President-elect 
Walter F. Mondale reshaped the vice presidency by 
bringing the second officer, and his office, into the White 
House and into the President’s inner circle.256  The Vice 
President became an across-the-board presidential 
adviser and troubleshooter, a role that depended on 
 
254.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (1804); U.S. CONST. amend. XX (1933); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (1951); U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (1967). 
255.  See GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 
308-14. 
256.  See Id. at 48-92. 
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extensive access to the President, the information he 
received, and other necessary resources Carter gave 
Mondale so he could function in this role.257  The principal 
function of the White House vice presidency became 
helping the President on a regular basis, not the 
contingent successor role.  Carter and Mondale’s five 
successors have each been part of the President’s inner 
circle with Mondale’s role and resources.258  For six 
administrations, the basic features of the White House 
vice presidency have existed and become more 
entrenched with each repetition.259 
The White House vice presidency developed through 
the creation of new practices which better responded to 
the needs of the presidency and constitutional system and 
through their repetition by subsequent administrations.  
The vice-presidential vision of the Twenty-fifth Amendment 
certainly provides some structural support for this new 
vice-presidential model, yet that model did not develop in 
response to the Amendment.260  In fact, more than a 
decade, and four vice presidencies, passed between the 
articulation of the vision and the creation of the White 
House vice presidency. 261 
The White House vice presidency marked a further 
and interesting constitutional development.  Whereas the 
original constitution gave the Vice President the primary 
role of presiding over the Senate, with the contingent role 
as presidential successor, and whereas much of the 
twentieth century saw the successor role as primary, the 
White House vice presidency created an ongoing role for 
the Vice President in the executive branch, indeed in the 
West Wing.  It made helping the existing President 
succeed, not succeeding that President, primary.  
Whereas the Twelfth Amendment separated the election 
of the President and Vice President, the White House vice 
 
257.  Id. at 70-89. 
258.  Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 401. 
259.  See GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 32, at 
307-10. 
260.  Goldstein, Constitutional Change, supra note 27, at 405-06. 
261.  See id. at 399-401 (noting that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was 
proposed in 1965, but the White House vice presidency was not fully realized until 
Walter Mondale served under President Jimmy Carter). 
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presidency gave added impetus to the argument that the 
Vice President must be presidential, not simply vice 
presidential.  Otherwise, how could he or she discharge 
the ongoing roles of the office not to mention the 
successor role?  Once again practice created new norms 
that improved the vice presidency. 
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This snapshot of constitutional provisions relating to 
the vice presidency allows some generalizations regarding 
the role of history in constitutional interpretation outside 
the courts. Historical argument pervades constitutional 
interpretation, not simply the history surrounding the 
original creation of constitutional texts but the evolving 
history of institutional development.  Original history is not 
always followed.  In fact, political actors have often 
deviated from original intent, understanding, expectations, 
and meaning in clauses relating to the vice presidency.  At 
times the deviation has simply followed prior divergent 
behavior, like the perpetuation of the Tyler Precedent.  On 
other occasions, new practice has rested on consequential 
or prudential reasoning that identified an emerging 
practice as a more sensible arrangement.  The move of 
the vice presidency from being largely a legislative officer 
to its current status as an intrinsic part of the presidency 
provides an example.  Many of these institutions that 
practice and consequential reasoning created have won 
wide-spread support even though they defy the 
Constitution’s original history.  That experience should 
caution those who celebrate original history as a guide to 
constitutional interpretation to the exclusion of other forms 
of experience. 
Public servants often invoke prior practice to justify 
behavior.  Seven Vice Presidents who succeeded to the 
presidency in the nineteenth and twentieth century relied 
on the Tyler Precedent to justify their claims.  In fact, the 
practice quickly won such acceptance that no citation was 
needed.  Similarly, Kennedy and Johnson perpetuated the 
Eisenhower-Nixon inability arrangement.  The assumption 
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of executive duties by the Vice President became 
accepted as Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Congress 
noted prior behavior approvingly and acquiesced in it. 
Practice and consequential argument allow 
institutions to develop in a more flexible manner than does 
originalism.  They allow subsequent generations to correct 
some of the framers’ mistakes and to accommodate 
developments those who originated a constitutional text 
did not anticipate without the enormous effort required of a 
constitutional amendment.  Learning from history, rather 
than being bound by it, often produces more workable 
government based on prior experience. 
Ongoing history is also more historically inclusive than 
originalism.  Whereas originalism seeks to understand the 
experience and conclusions of the one generation that 
produced a text, practice and consequential argument 
engage those of multiple generations.  Ongoing history 
also candidly lends itself to experimentation and to 
correction as failed ventures can be abandoned or 
modified.  Eisenhower’s informal disability arrangement 
drew from the lessons of prior history.  So, too, the 
development of the White House vice presidency learned 
from the mistakes of various administrations in trying to 
find an executive role for the Vice President.  As David 
Strauss suggests, constitutional arguments that draw on 
history as it develops show “respect for the accumulated 
wisdom of the past.”262  They view the Constitution as “the 
work of generations of people—lawyers and nonlawyers, 
public officials and people living private lives—who have 
grappled with society’s problems and done their best to 
pass what they have learned on to us.”263 
Although repeated practice tends to have an enduring 
quality, it does not necessarily chart an inexorable 
historical path.  Just as courts can depart from judicial 
precedent, political institutions can deviate from patterns 
of nonjudicial activity when circumstance so dictates.  As 
suggested above, Vice Presidents long thought they were 
obliged to preside over the Senate regularly until Nixon 
 
262.  STRAUSS, supra note 16, at 139. 
263.  Id. 
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changed course in 1953 to assume a larger executive and 
political role, thereby creating a new historical pattern as 
his successors followed course.  The move of the Vice 
President to the executive branch, which Nixon 
accelerated, did not signal the move a quarter century 
later to the White House that Carter and Mondale 
produced.  In each instance, an administration deviated 
from the past practice and created a new historical pattern 
that imitation entrenched. 
Moreover, ongoing history often serves as the basis 
for what is constitutionally permitted or expected but not 
necessarily what is constitutionally required.  The practice 
of parties slotting tickets had become permissible based 
on past behavior before the Twelfth Amendment, but 
surely practice could have reverted to the conduct the 
framers intended without being unlawful. 
Based on historical practice, the Vice President need 
not preside over the Senate without violating his or her 
duty but retains that right (except in the limited situations 
when it is constitutionally proscribed). 
Structural argument is historical in an ongoing as well 
as originalist sense.  The Constitution we expound was 
created over time, not simply in 1787.  Amendments that 
post-dated the founding have revised the Constitution’s 
structure and added new themes to constitutional 
reasoning or given familiar concepts different weight.  Just 
as the Civil War Amendments affected the federal balance 
and the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, 
and Twenty-sixth Amendments altered ideas of 
democratic accountability, so, too, did the Twelfth, 
Twentieth, Twenty-second, and Twenty-fifth Amendments 
modify the structure of the presidency.  Understanding the 
Constitution’s structural ideas regarding the presidency, 
vice presidency, and other governmental institutions 
requires considering the Constitution that now exists, not 
simply the original document.  Since these provisions were 
added to the Constitution at different times, the enterprise 
requires engaging in a journey through time to elicit the 
concepts and patterns they suggest and applying them to 
situations that arise. 
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Much of what I have said suggests limitations of 
original history in constitutional interpretation, yet original 
intent and meaning retain an important place in 
constitutional practice.  Consistent with original design, the 
Vice President remains the first successor and entitled to 
preside over the Senate and break its tie votes.  
Consistent with the Twelfth Amendment, electors vote 
separately for Vice President and, for better or worse, the 
Electoral College chooses the Vice President as well as 
the President.  Vice-presidential qualifications mirror those 
of the President.264 
Originalism may have greater value in interpreting 
more recent constitutional amendments relating to the 
office since the available records are more comprehensive 
and allow more certain judgments of their purposes and 
meaning.  Whereas the records of the original history of 
the Constitution proposed in 1787 and ratified the 
following year are pretty incomplete and accordingly may 
suggest erroneous inferences especially to modern 
interpreters who must try to recreate the context of those 
unfamiliar times, the documentation regarding the Twenty-
fifth, Twenty-second, or Twentieth Amendments are more 
complete.  There are times when stability and certainty 
have their place, at least as a starting point, and original 
history, when it can be discovered and understood, has 
that virtue and may shed light on the purposes and 
expectations that animated and informed fragments of 
constitutional text.  Those attributes must be weighed 
against the loss of flexibility and of experience as a source 
of education.  Original history also focuses attention on 
one period whereas ongoing history may require a broader 
inquiry. 
Finally, constitutional interpretation demands that 
judicial and nonjudicial actors have skill and sensitivity as 
historians.  Although the challenges of historical inquiry 
differ in some respects depending on the type of historical 
argument involved, they all require constitutional 
interpreters to look backwards.  That enterprise requires 
 
264.  U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“But no person constitutionally ineligible to the 
office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.”). 
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not simply obtaining the relevant information, but putting 
that data in the context of the period from which they 
came.  Those engaged in historical inquiry must recognize 
both that the past looks different when refracted by the 
lens of succeeding periods than it did to those who lived in 
that time or in immediately succeeding eras and that 
judgments are inevitably filtered through the subjectivity of 
the person who is looking backwards for knowledge or 
guidance.  Different historians find different lessons in the 
same data.  These inherent features of historical inquiry 
present challenges for historians.  They, at least, are 
trained in the enterprise and are presumably alert to the 
difficulties and skilled at addressing them.  The problems 
are graver for lawyers and politicians who lack historical 
training and may not be aware of the limitations of their 
understanding.  Those who engage in historical argument 
should be aware of the hazards and approach the 
enterprise with some humility. 
Discussions of the use of history in constitutional 
interpretation in some respects parallel debates 
elsewhere.  Experts in many fields consider the extent to 
which history is guided by events that occurred at a single 
moment or those that unfold over an extended time.  The 
debates between the role of nature or nurture in human 
behavior is one such example.  Those discussions involve 
an inquiry which divides influences between a starting 
point and subsequent development. 
There is room for many modes of constitutional 
history, the original and ongoing, in interpreting the 
Constitution, regarding the vice presidency and all else.  
The challenge is to recover history, learn from it, enlist it, 
so we can produce constitutional doctrine and practices 
that will allow the Constitution we are expounding to 
endure for the ages. 
